Смоленск 1812 года – «ворота Москвы»

Abstract

Рассмотрена роль Смоленска – «ворот Москвы» в 1812 г. Показаны факторы, которые не позволили Смо-ленску стать базой для наполеоновской армии, в результате чего был провален план двухлетней кампании, разработанный перед началом войны штабами в Париже и Варшаве. Он предусматривал приостановку наступ-ления на границах бывшей Речи Посполитой и в Смоленске – «воротах Москвы». Раскрыты причины, почему Смоленск не был приготовлен к принятию возвращающихся из-под Москвы наполеоновских войск и не мог быть использован Наполеоном для зимовки Великой армии в ноябре 1812 г. The article says about the role of Smolensk – the Gate to Moscow in the year 1812. It shows factors that caused Smolensk not to be a base for Napoleon’s army and why the plans of two years campaign made in Paris and Warsaw that should stop the offensive on Polish border in Smolensk – the Gate to Moscow – wasn’t accomplished. It says why Smolensk wasn’t prepared for receiving Napoleon’s army returning from Moscow and couldn’t be used by Napoleon as a winter base in November of 1812. I want to show Napoleon’s mistakes that led to fail of building the biggest logistic center for the Great Army in Smolensk. This was caused by leading the whole army to the East – to Moscow. Unsufficient forces remained near Smolensk. As a result governors of Smolensk attacked by Russians weren’t able to build logistic center. Napoleon didn’t secure the situation in Ukraine and Lithuania as well. He gave command of army protecting Ukraine to Karl von Schwarzenberg – an Austrian general favourable to Russians. He also made reluctant to Poland ignoramus Dutchman Dirk van Hogendorp general governor of Lithuania. In November 1812 when Napoleon reached Smolensk, the keep could’t be converted into the Great Army’s base and become its infrastructure for war against Russia in 1813.