

## HATE LANGUAGE AS A NEGATIVE PHENOMENON OF THE UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC MEDIA SPACE IN NEWS CONTENT ABOUT THE WAR

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**Abstract:** The article presents an analysis of hate speech in news content about the war. The study was conducted on the basis of the materials of Ukrainian domestic mass media (regional and all-Ukrainian). The negative impact of this phenomenon in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war is indicated (it leads to the division of society, conflicts between separate groups of citizens, demoralization of Ukrainians, discrediting of one in the eyes of others). Those social groups of people, which are subject to hate speech in journalistic materials the most are differentiated (internally displaced persons, Russian-speaking Ukrainians). The reasons for the spread of hate rhetoric in the headline complex of the studied texts were revealed: clickbait, sensationalism, ignorance of the topic of the material. The analysis of manifestations of hate speech in the Ukrainian mass media was carried out on the basis of monitoring the news of regional and of all-Ukrainian mass media, conducted by the Institute of Mass Information, "Media Detector". In the research, we also use the advice of leading media experts investigating the topic of hate rhetoric. It was found that manifestations of hate speech are the dissemination of information in any form that contains hostile attitudes, intolerance, disgust, offensive or derogatory comparisons. The rhetoric of hate speech contributes to the development of social stereotypes, forms prejudice and generates discrimination. After the full-scale invasion, a large number of Russian negative 'messages' entered the Ukrainian media space, trying to sow hatred, divide society, and discredit some Ukrainians in the eyes of others. Under this influence, negative statements penetrate the domestic mass media, often spontaneously, testifying to manifestations of "hate speech". Emphasis is placed on the incorrect use by the Western Ukrainian mass media of the terms *refugees* instead of normative ones *displaced persons*, *internally displaced persons*, and *temporarily displaced persons*. Generalization and stereotyping in the depiction of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in criminal materials, Russian-speaking citizens in the context of war, which gives rise to hate rhetoric in publications, is noted. It has been revealed that changes in the use of language tools caused by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine are also reflected in the textual culture of journalistic publications. At the same time, the choice of stylistically colored vocabulary should take into account the genre of the material, the topic and the audience. Recommendations are also provided for tolerance in the media sphere and avoiding negative statements that help the enemy promote false narratives.

**Keywords:** hate speech; news; war; Ukrainian mass media; correct vocabulary.

### 1 Introduction

The language palette of modern mass media is a way of creating an information picture of the world. Today, journalism is tasked with the mission of forming public opinion, and this, accordingly, requires media workers to take great responsibility for compliance with professional standards and ethical norms. In the conditions of war, it is important not only to present an objective picture of events, being guided by the standards of reliability and accuracy, but also to adhere to moral and ethical norms, to use a correct set of vocabulary. After all, the rhetoric of hatred, which Russia is trying to "push" into the Ukrainian information space under the guise of hostile narratives, often finds expression in the domestic Ukrainian mass media due to journalistic oversight. Negative statements used by modern media for clickbait have a significant impact on the formation of the information space and the radicalization of attitudes in society. Instead of cohesion, which is so necessary in the conditions of war, they often lead to the division of society, conflicts between individual groups of citizens, demoralization of Ukrainians, discrediting of some groups in the eyes of others, etc. The way out of this situation is the introduction of certain ethical rules for journalists, which can serve as a guide when preparing materials. It is the responsibility of the media environment itself, relevant ethics commissions and other self-regulatory bodies to monitor compliance with these rules. Ethical violations in most cases do not lead to legal liability, but in a healthy media environment they should cause condemnation

of manifestations of such violations by other members of the environment. The main task of journalism is to work for society and in the interests of society [5].

Hate speech describes and hierarchically compares various groups of people and evaluates the personal qualities of specific individuals based on their belonging to a particular group. This is a statement or a context that leads to the creation or deepening of the already revealed enmity between groups of society that differ in certain characteristics. Within the boundaries of Ukrainian society, these are groups, most often distinguished by territorial origin, political or social views, as well as sex minorities, religious and ethnic minorities.

Hate speech is a source of controlling the people, creating information wars, which, in the end, can provoke physical clashes, armed conflicts and military actions. History knows a lot of cases when the mass media were used as a tool to influence the masses, aggressive propaganda and manipulation, and, as a consequence, total control over people.

In the conditions of a real war, when covering the conflict and the people associated with it, it is necessary to be tolerant towards one's citizens, use ethically correct vocabulary, and avoid stereotypes and evaluative judgments. Among the most obvious reasons for violations in this field, there is the pursuit of ratings and sensationalism, which often lead to a taste for violence, death or crime. Another block of reasons is related to the lack of specialist knowledge of the topic and the reluctance to spend time on research. Often, for the same reasons, media persons resort to negative statements.

Manifestations of hate speech are the dissemination of information in any form that contains hostile attitudes, intolerance, disgust, offensive or derogatory comparisons. The rhetoric of hate speech contributes to the development of social stereotypes, forms prejudice and generates discrimination. The most uncontrolled spread of hate speech occurs in social networks, where users often leave offensive comments and use negatively colored words with impunity and anonymity, which can provoke sharp conflicts between different social groups. The problem of hate speech in the media space is not limited to thematic publics and posts. Even traditional mass media violate journalistic standards and ethical norms, forgetting about elementary tolerance. Today, the media are often complicit in the flourishing of intolerance and ignorance, which poses a real danger to free social development. In the worldview of the rhetoric of hatred, all "others" are perceived through the opposition of "own – aliens", and therefore - dangerous. The consequence of this is the generation of aggression and the distortion of real problems. At the same time, the information space turns into a battlefield between "hostile" groups, which creates the prerequisites for considering hate speech as a social problem that affects not only the most discriminated groups, but also the entire society as a whole. According to H. Pryshepa's definition, "hate speech" is a technology aimed at changing the value attitudes of various target audiences, at forming ideas about both the enemy and fellow citizens who fall under the categories of "other", "alien", and "incomprehensible". "Language of hatred" is a kind of "soft power" of waging a "hybrid war" that forms certain linguistic and cultural, cognitive and pragmatic attitudes, aimed at denigrating the culture and ideals of the participant on the opposite side of the conflict [19, p. 107]. The use of hate speech in journalism leads to the spewing of linguistic aggression both on the part of the author of the material and on the part of the information consumer, who, accepting or rejecting the position of the journalist, passes this stream of aggression through his own perception.

The object of hatred, aggression, and discrimination is usually a person or a group of persons who fits the definition of "other": race, ethnicity, religion, party, orientation, minority.

After the full-scale invasion, a large number of Russian negativity entered the Ukrainian media space, trying to sow hatred, divide society, and discredit some Ukrainians in the eyes of others. Under this influence, negative statements penetrate the domestic mass media, often spontaneously, testifying to manifestations of “hate speech”. Despite the fact that the number of materials containing hate speech has decreased significantly since the beginning of the war with Russia, we still come across publications in which residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine or internally displaced persons are sporadically the objects of hate speech. In order to reduce the penetration of hateful expressions into the language of modern domestic Ukrainian mass media, it is necessary to develop mechanisms for combating hate speech both at the regional and all-Ukrainian levels.

## 2 Materials and Method

In recent years, the emergence of materials devoted to debatable moments of manifestations of so-called hate speech in the mass media has intensified. But these publications and researches are carried out by specialists in journalism, media experts, representatives of the Institute of Mass Information in Ukraine (IMI), while there are relatively few scientific studies aimed at studying this lexical layer in the Ukrainian mass media. Thus, within the framework of the “Without Borders” project, the public organization “Social Action Center” published a collection of texts “Hate speech and mass media: International standards and approaches” (Kyiv, 2015) (edited by O. Bondarenko, M. Butkevich, and I. Fedorovych). The publication describes the approaches of media experts to hate speech, the regulation of its use in the mass media, as well as standards and recommendations for the coverage of various topics by journalists [18]. As an object of scientific description, the language of hostility was studied by T. Mendel and I. Stogrin. The rhetoric of enmity has also been studied by E. Baker, S. Hayman, B. Parekh, M. Hertz, P. Molnar, A. Brown, J. Howard, and others. In the Ukrainian language, the concept of “hate speech” has become widespread, which is a copy from English. Currently, there is no generally accepted term among domestic scientists. Researchers O. Horbacheva [9], T. Isakova [11], Yu. Chumak [2] use the phrase “*мова ворожечі*” (“language of enmity”), H. Pryshchepa [19] uses word combination “*мова ненависті*” (“language of hatred”). Sporadically we come across the terms “language of intolerance”, “rhetoric of hatred”, “expression of enmity/hate/disgust”. The most common definition is given in the Recommendation of the Council of Europe to member states, according to which hate speech is all forms of expression (provoking, promoting, facilitating or justifying) of racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of hatred based on intolerance, which can be expressed in the form of aggressive nationalism, ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility towards minorities, migrants, and people of immigrant origin [4].

O. Golub in the book “*Mediacompass: A professional journalist's guide*” notes that “in the work of a journalist, it is unacceptable to use hate speech and discriminate against certain social groups” [5, p. 71]. Sporadic attention has been paid to international standards and approaches to avoid hate speech in mass media [18]. The language of enmity as a scientific category is thought out by V. Savonchak, who is noting the debatable nature of the concept itself [20].

In the context of the war, since the time of hostilities in the East of Ukraine, hate speech has been studied in publications on the websites of Radio Svoboda, the Donetsk Institute of Information, the Center for Democracy and the Rule of Law, and the Institute of Mass Information. O. Horbacheva calls hate speech a manifestation of xenophobia [9]. T. Isakova considers hate speech to be an important problem of the modern information space [11]. The legal aspect of this concept in the European context is studied by M. Medvedeva, E. Dibrivna, and R. Kukharchuk [14]. Before the full-scale invasion, hate speech was seen as a tool of so-called “hybrid” warfare, cf. research by H. Pryshchepa, who analyzes enemy language as a linguistic

marker of “hybrid war” [19]. Our research on manifestations of hate speech in the headline complex of regional publications is also relevant [21].

The analysis of manifestations of hate speech in the news content about the war was carried out on the basis of news monitoring of regional and all-Ukrainian mass media conducted by the Institute of Mass Information, “Media Detector”. In the study, we also use the advice of leading media experts investigating the topic of hate speech.

In order to fully meet the chosen goal of researching negative language expressions in mass media, the following methodology was used: methods of classification, systematic analysis and synthesis to describe the different views of scientists regarding the definition of the term “hate speech”, its classification characteristics; we applied methods of analysis and monitoring when characterizing the ethical permissibility of used statements containing a hostile context in the mass media. In the scientific literature, similar, but not identical, concepts are used to denote this phenomenon: “verbal extremism”, “language (speech) aggression”, “language demagoguery”, “language conflict”, “language (speech) violence”, “language manipulation”. Despite the presence of occasional research on this issue as a scientific problem, the study of the language situation regarding the observance of the ethics of rhetorical statements and the use of harmful vocabulary in the Ukrainian mass media is relevant.

The purpose and task of the research is to analyze examples of hate speech in news content about the war based on the material of the domestic Ukrainian mass media, to indicate the negative impact of this phenomenon in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, to differentiate those social groups of people who are exposed to hate-speech in journalistic materials, to identify the reasons for the spread of hate rhetoric in the heading complex of the studied texts, to provide recommendations on media tolerance and avoidance of negative speech that helps the enemy promote false narratives.

## 3 Results and Discussion

In today's media space, the flow of information with hate speech is continuous. The start of using hate speech for own purposes was in the 20th century. Due to the rapid spread of negative information and a society sensitive to aggressive rhetoric, hate speech has become a tool of propaganda and various manipulations.

The “Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian Journalist” states: “No one can be discriminated against because of their gender, language, race, religion, national, regional or social origin or political preferences. It is necessary to indicate the relevant characteristics of a person (group of people) only in cases where this information is an integral part of the material. It is necessary to refrain from allusions or comments related to physical defects or diseases of a person, to avoid the use of offensive expressions, profanity” [3].

In this regard, T. Pechonchuk, a member of the Commission on Journalistic Ethics, claims that many definitions of “hate speech” are based on establishing the fact of inciting enmity, humiliation or discrimination based on certain characteristics in the statements. The source of hate speech is negative stereotypes or superstitions, which are often produced in order to justify discrimination, most often ethnic or “racial”. The persistent desire to exaggerate the alleged anti-social tendencies of representatives of ethnic or “racial” minorities is explained by the peculiarities of the human psyche. People tend, firstly, under the impression of rare phenomena to give them much more importance than these phenomena deserve; secondly, they tend to attribute to one's group the most desirable moral qualities that favorably distinguish it from other groups (as it is known, “one's own” is usually equated with a positive assessment, and “other's” in most cases is assessed either neutrally or negatively); and thirdly, there is a tendency to exaggerate the negative qualities of “strangers”, transferring them from individual persons to whole groups to which they belong [17]. Stereotypes are an integral

part of hate speech, prejudices are formed from them, and a negative attitude towards a certain phenomenon or person is formed from them. This simplifies the picture of perception and divides everything into "black and white, good and bad." Veiled forms of hate speech in mass media allow the addressee to create statements with the help of units at levels higher than the lexical level, and usually involve the use of only literary words. Hate speech is often based on such phenomena as social stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. T. Isakova believes that this concept is part of a broader and more complex phenomenon - communication based on prejudice and discrimination. "This is communication based on stereotyped cognitive schemes, negative attitudes (prejudices) and discriminatory intentions towards any groups of people or individual persons as members of these groups" [11, c. 92]. Today, studies of this phenomenon distinguish three types of hate speech: harsh (direct and veiled calls to violence; calls to discrimination; calls to prevent the group from gaining a foothold in the region); medium (justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination; accusation of a certain group of having a negative impact on society or the state; publications and statements that call into question generally recognized historical facts of violence and discrimination; statements about historical crimes of a certain ethnic, religious or certain social group as such; statements about the criminality of a particular ethnic, religious, or certain social group; assertions about its inferiority; reflection on the disproportionate advantage of a particular ethnic, religious, or certain social group; accusation of a particular ethnic, religious, or certain social group of a negative influence on society, the state; accusing the group of attempts to seize power or territorial expansion; denial of citizenship); weak (creating a negative image of a certain group in society; asserting the inferiority and moral shortcomings of such a group; opposing one group to another; mentioning a group or individual members of it in a derogatory or offensive context; a direct or veiled statement that one group creates inconvenience in the existence of another; xenophobic statements without commenting).

In the conditions of war, based on research by the Institute of Mass Information Research, manifestations of hate speech in the Ukrainian media space have significantly decreased, however, the following forms of its manifestation (mostly medium or weak ones) have been observed: discriminatory naming of a certain population group; calls to prevent the group from gaining a foothold in the region; statement about the criminality of a certain territorial or ethnic group; accusing a certain group of having a negative impact on society or the state; statements about its inferiority, moral shortcomings; mention of the group or its individual representatives in a derogatory or offensive context; opposition of one group to another; a direct or veiled statement that one group creates inconvenience in the existence of another [8].

Manifestations of the language of hostility in journalistic materials even before the full-scale invasion were publications that formed a negative image of ATO participants through the headline palette, focusing especially on this: "Колишній АТОВець зберігав на Волині арсенал зброї" ("A former ATO warrior kept an arsenal of weapons in Volyn") ("District. Lutsk", November 15, 2016); "АТОВець відлучував маришутника, який відмовився взяти його безплатно" ("ATO warrior beat a bus driver who refused to take him for free") ("Volyn", September 17, 2018); "Ножем у горло: АТОВець по-звірчачому вбив дружину під Луцьком" ("With a knife to the throat: an ATO soldier brutally killed his wife near Lutsk") ("Під прицілом", October 28, 2018); "На Волині ветеран АТО з інвалідністю зарізав жінку" ("In Volyn, a disabled ATO veteran killed a woman") ("Volyn", October 27, 2018); "На Волині зарізався атошник" ("An ATO soldier killed himself in Volyn") (Volyn24, May 06, 2017); "Волинський атошник привіз додому чималий арсенал" ("Volyn's ATO warrior brought home a considerable arsenal") ("VolynPost", November 15, 2016). We come across an incorrectly worded lexical base in the following headlines: "На Волині застрелився атошник" ("ATO warrior shot himself in Volyn") ("Volyn24", April 16, 2017); "Безвісти зник 24-річний

атошник із Волині" ("24-year-old ATO soldier from Volyn is missing") ("Volyn News", March 13, 2018); "Атошники з Волині отримують земельні ділянки біля Світязя" ("ATO warriors from Volyn will receive land plots near Svityaz") ("Konkurent", March 04, 2016), etc. Such generalized statements are provocative and could give rise to a negative attitude towards the participants of the hostilities in the east of Ukraine during the ATO period; therefore, we consider them incorrect from the point of view of the moral and ethical principles of covering this image in the mass media.

The results of a study by the Institute of Mass Information in November 2022 regarding the presence of hate speech in the regional media after the full-scale invasion showed positive dynamics, because a relatively low level of hate speech is recorded the news content of the domestic Ukrainian media space – only 0.3 % of publications from the total number of news about the war. Materials containing hate speech were published in five regions: Dnipro (1.3 %), Lviv (1 %), Volyn (0.6 %), Rivne (0.4 %) and Donetsk (0.2 %) [10].

After the full-scale invasion and the increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the territories where active hostilities were taking place, the Western Ukrainian media space was flooded with news with the incorrectly used lexeme *біженці* (refugees) instead of normative *переселенці* (displaced persons, internally displaced persons, temporarily displaced persons), which we observe in the headline complex: "На Волинь розселили 13 тисяч біженців. Є ще місця для 5 тисяч осіб" ("13 thousand refugees were resettled in Volyn. There are still places for 5,000 people") ("Volyn News", March 15, 2022); "На Волині розселили понад 6 тисяч біженців" ("More than 6,000 refugees were resettled in Volyn") ("Volyn Post", March 05, 2022); "Повідомили, скільки тисяч біженців розселили на Волині за добу" ("They reported how many thousands of refugees were resettled in Volyn per day") ("Konkurent", March 07, 2022); "Куди звертатись біженцям у Львові та як їм допомогти" ("Where refugees can turn to in Lviv and how to help them") (Zaxid.net, February 26, 2022); "Допомога біженцям у Львові: куди звертатись переселенцям" ("Help for refugees in Lviv: where displaced people can turn to") ("UNIAN", March 14, 2022); "Львів'ян просять допомогти біженцям: що потрібно" ("Lviv inhabitants are asked to help refugees: what is needed") ("Suspilne.News", February 24, 2022). However, usually in the lead or in the text of the publication of the same materials, journalists use the correct vocabulary: "У Львові на стадіоні «Арена Львів» діє центр розселення вимушених переселенців, окрім того, в місті є кілька точок, де збирають допомогу для них" ("In Lviv, there is a resettlement center for forcibly displaced people at the "Arena Lviv" stadium, in addition, there are several points in the city where help is collected for them") (Zaxid.net, February 26, 2022); "На цей час у Львові працює 7 координаційних центрів для вимушено переміщених осіб" ("There are currently 7 coordination centers for forcibly displaced persons in Lviv") ("UNIAN", March 14, 2022); "У Львові створили координаційний центр для допомоги вимушено переміщеним особам" ("A coordination center has been created in Lviv to help forcibly displaced persons") ("Suspilne.News", February 24, 2022). Media experts claim that, "according to the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, this word refers to people who are outside the borders of their country and have crossed the official border. In the case of the Ukrainian conflict, regarding people who moved from temporarily occupied territories, it is correct to use the names "forced migrants" or "people who were forced to leave their homes" [5, p. 99].

Russian information and psychological operations (IPSO), as well as the false narratives spread through them in wartime, often use statements that incite conflict between residents of western and eastern Ukraine. In particular, there is a well-known narrative that it is the residents of the east and south of Ukraine who are to blame for Russia attacking them, because they speak Russian and, therefore, have pro-Russian sentiments. This thesis,

in various guises, is repeatedly thrown into the infospace with tangible manipulations. The mentioned IPSO is very beneficial to the Russian mass media, because it shifts the responsibility for the invading aggression of the occupiers to those Ukrainians who speak Russian. Among the false subnarratives that contribute to the division of the population of Ukraine, there are those that express the opposition between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking residents. They also got into the Ukrainian communication space, in particular, the Tiktok network: *“Мій будинок розбомбили, а коли я розкажую про це львів'янам, то їхня єдина реакція: “Чому не українською?” (“My house was bombed, and when I tell the people of Lviv about it, their only reaction is: “Why not in Ukrainian?””); “У Львові не дали їжу дитині, бо її мати розмовляла російською мовою” (“In Lviv, they did not give food to a child because his mother spoke Russian”), “Волонтери зі Львова не дають їжу російськомовним” (“Volunteers from Lviv do not give food to Russian speakers”), “Жінка на Донбасі відмовлялася годувати пораненого українського бійця, поки той не заплатив 500 грн” (“A woman in Donbas refused to feed a wounded Ukrainian soldier until he paid UAH 500”). We understand that it was not actually the use of the Russian language in the Ukrainian-speaking space that caused the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine, but geographical logistics contributed to this, because temporarily occupied or captured settlements are located mainly on the border territory. In the war conditions, the narrative that while the south and east of Ukraine are being destroyed by the occupiers, the west is living a peaceful and calm life is repeatedly circulating on the Internet. First of all, this thesis is broadcast in Facebook groups and Viber communities in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. In modern realities, we observe the falsity of this statement, because one cannot be categorical about “peaceful” life in the West, because it is impossible in the conditions of war. Western Ukrainian critical infrastructure also suffers from aviators. Ukrainian men and women are also going to the front from this territory, ready to give their lives to protect their native people from Russian aggression. The narrative that all “Westerners” are fighting on the front lines, while “Easterners” allegedly fled, circulates in the media space in various interpretations. The harmfulness of this statement is obvious, since the deceptive thesis about the flight of people from the east to the west of Ukraine or abroad is aimed at spreading the conflict between Ukrainians. The audience of the specified IPSO actually includes residents of the western regions of Ukraine. Namely there, based on everyday observations, a false impression is formed that only men and women from the west are fighting. Such unjustified generalizations arose on the basis of two facts: the appearance of a large number of internally displaced persons from the east and south in the western regions, as well as information about local residents who began to defend their native state. In fact, at the front, in the ranks of the Armed Forces and in the rear, the Ukrainian people are protected by people from all regions of Ukraine, their share is represented almost evenly, without any significant emphasis in favor of the west, east, north, south, or center.*

The enemy' narrative *“Захід України наживається на переселенцях” (“Western Ukraine is profiting from the displaced people”)*, expressed by the most diverse sub-narratives (*“Львів'яни підняли ціни на квартири, щоб нажитися на постраждалих” (“Lviv residents raised the prices of apartments to profit from the victims”)*, etc.) tries to discredit those Ukrainians who live in Western Ukraine in order to cause conflicts with temporarily displaced persons. One of the tools for the functioning of narratives is a fake, which, through false content, broadcasts the enemy's thesis to society. The Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council has repeatedly refuted fakes about “ungrateful immigrants from the East of Ukraine” who, according to provocative user reports, allegedly behave in the West “like at a resort”. In order to divide Ukrainians, such information was actively disseminated in social networks. Then it turned out that the employees of the Center called all sanatoriums and resorts of Western Ukraine to find out the real picture. The owners of the hotels reported that the displaced people behave modestly, sign

up for the territorial defense detachments, and actively take part in volunteer activities.

The “TSN” publication contains negatively colored content: *“Виявилася прихильницею “руського міра”: у Польщі з елітного готелю зі скандалом вигнали харків'янку” (“She turned out to be a supporter of the “Russian peace”: in Poland, a woman from Kharkiv was expelled from an elite hotel with a scandal”)* (“TSN”, April 06, 2022). The journalists published the video without blurring the face. There is also no comment from the other side of the conflict, which violates the standard of balance of opinion. Similar one is the news with the title *“Соромно говорити українською»: волянянка у Польщі обурилася підтримкою та увагою українців” (“It's a shame to speak Ukrainian”: a Volyn woman in Poland was outraged by the support and attention of Ukrainians”)* (“Volyn News”, November 07, 2022). The publication quotes the words of a girl from Tiktok video, who is originally from Volyn and now lives in Poland. The girl said that she is ashamed to speak Ukrainian there when she meets her friend, so that people are not looked at them in the wrong way. She also complained about Ukrainian symbols in Poland and Ukrainian inscriptions. Considering the fact that the heroine of the news is not a public figure, it seems unreasonable to rely on her opinion, which is not authoritative. Therefore, it would be quite possible for journalists to do without this publication, so as not to play along with the enemy's informational and psychological operations.

L. Kuzmenko, a member of the Commission on Journalistic Ethics, notes that it is unequivocally unacceptable to divide Ukrainians into “we” and “they”. In the conditions of martial law, compliance with standards and journalistic ethics by Ukrainian media is not only a sign of professionalism, but also the prevention of new manipulations, fakes or propaganda by the occupiers [13]. After all, any, even small, flaws in the work of Ukrainian journalists are immediately picked up by the Russian mass media and, based on them, various types of false narratives are spun. Domestic Ukrainian media, on the one hand, unconsciously, without thinking about the consequences, on the other hand, deliberately spread news containing hate speech to create hype or clickability of content. For example, the headlines *“У Львові харків'янин кинув у патрульних дві гранати: може отримати довічне” (“In Lviv, a man from Kharkiv threw two grenades at patrolmen: he may receive a life sentence”)* (“The 5<sup>th</sup> Channel”, September 04, 2022); *“На Левандівці унімали злочинця з Донецька” (“A criminal from Donetsk was caught in Levandivka (photo)”)* (“Warta 1”, December 06, 2022); *“На Волині затримали грабіжника з Донеччини” (“A robber from Donetsk region was detained in Volyn”)* (“Volyn24”, October 20, 2022), *“Переселенець із Луганська облаштував нарколабораторію в Луцьку” (“A migrant from Luhansk set up a drug laboratory in Lutsk”)* (“Konkurent”, April 14, 2022); *“На заході України переселенець підпалив чужий автомобіль” (“In western Ukraine, an internally displaced man set someone else's car on fire”)* (“Volyn24”, November 10, 2022); *“На Волині переселенець задушив чоловіка” (“In Volyn, an internally displaced man strangled a man”)* (“Volyn24”, November 12, 2022) create a negative attitude among readers towards internally displaced persons, and can also cause conflicts in the communities that host the internal migrants. The indication of territorial belonging does not give us anything except a false impression that the alleged residents of Donetsk or Kharkiv can pose a danger to society. According to Article 15 of the Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian journalist, it is necessary to indicate the characteristics of a person or a group of persons only when this information is truly an indispensable component of the publication [3].

Internally displaced persons were stereotypically typified in the materials of the criminal chronicle and on the TSN website in the publication *“На Черкащині горе-переселенець з Києва обікрав друга, якого прихистив” (“In Cherkasy region, a migrant from Kyiv attacked a friend whom he sheltered”)* (“TSN”, April 04, 2022). According to the media experts of the Institute of Mass Information, “it makes absolutely no difference who committed the theft: an internally displaced person or a

local. There is a fact of a crime and a person who committed a crime. However, due to such generalizations and details, that namely the emigrant stole, the quality of life of other IDPs may deteriorate – science society, due to stereotypes, will treat people who need support because they lost their home or had to leave their homes more carefully and coldly” [8]. In order to prevent the penetration of negative expressions in the mass media, journalists, writing about internally displaced persons, should avoid emotional quoting, should not generalize or stereotype these people. In the criminal materials, it should not be noted that the person is an IDP, because the crime does not concern a person's origin, except for Russians. It is also not worth spreading stereotypes about the oppression of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, as this narrative is often used by Russia, thus justifying the purpose of its invasion.

Changes in the use of language tools caused by the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine are also reflected in the text culture of the media. At the same time, the choice of stylistically colored vocabulary should take into account the genre of the material, the topic, and the audience. According to the Commission on Journalistic Ethics, the use of stylistically colored synonyms of *racists*, *racism* to expressions such as *Russian occupying forces*, *Russian invaders*, *military of the country-aggressor*, etc., in journalistic materials do not in any way discriminate against a group of people on the basis of nationality. In this case, it is not about belonging to a certain nationality, but belonging to a group that, in wartime, is hostile to Ukrainians, professes Russian-fascist ideology and acts in accordance with it. The recognition of the Russian regime as fascist is important for the consolidation of all anti-war forces and the termination of any contacts with the aggressor state, because the term *racism* as an abbreviated name of Russian fascism is actively interpreted by Ukrainian and foreign scientists. At the same time, it is advised to avoid such lexemes for the designation of the entire ethnic group of Russians. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the text should use neutral synonyms (*Russian military*, *Russian authorities*), which would make it clear that it is not about all Russians as an ethnic group [16]. These tokens should not be misused in news headlines, as, for example, in the mentioned publications: “Проти силового блоку української влади рашисти готують інформаційну атаку” (“*Rashists are preparing an information attack against the power bloc of the Ukrainian government*”) (“33<sup>rd</sup> Channel”, January 27, 2023); “Рашисти двічі за ніч атакували Тернопіль” (“*Rashists attacked Ternopil twice during the night*”) (May 14, 2023); “Рашисти знову обстріляли Херсонщину, серед загиблих – енергетики” (“*The rashists again shelled the Kherson region, among the dead there were energy workers*”) (“Lviv Portal”, May 03, 2023); “У Бородянці рашисти розстріляли пам’ятник Шевченку” (“*In Borodyanka, rashists shot down a monument to Shevchenko*”) (“High Castle”, April 05, 2022); “Рашисти посилюють репресивну машину” (“*The rashists are strengthening the repressive machine*”) (“High Castle”, September 26, 2022); “Мер Южного спростував фейк рашистів про збитий український літак” (“*The mayor of Yuzhnoye denied the fake reports of rashists about the downed Ukrainian plane*”) (“Intent”, May 28, 2023); “Ракетні удари чи наступальні дії: що готують рашисти до роковин війни (відео)” (“*Missile strikes or offensive actions: what the rashists are preparing for in the anniversary of the war* (video)”) (“Konkurent”, January 23, 2023). As we can see, in some cases, journalists still do not follow the advice of media specialists, calling the entire ethnic group of Russians as rashists.

Regarding the use of the euphemistic lexeme *orcs* (*орку*) in journalistic materials as a synonym for the phrases *Russian occupiers*, *Russian military*, *Russian war criminals*, the commission does not recommend using this word in publications of informational genres, in particular, news materials about the war, but advises to use the direct nomination - *Russian war criminals*. Media experts note: “If it is important to preserve the legal accuracy of terms in the text of the news (for example, in news about responsibility for war crimes), journalists should adhere to neutral vocabulary, use terms contained in Ukrainian legislation and terms of international law” [16]. It was observed

that Ukrainian journalists often use euphemisms, violating the mentioned recommendations, as evidenced by the titles of the publications: “Як створити напис тілами орків” (“*How to create an inscription with the bodies of orcs*”) (“Holovne in ua”, January 03, 2023); “Мертві орки та волонтерство: добрі новини від “ВолиньPost” за 11 грудня” (“*Dead orcs and volunteerism: good news from “VolynPost” for December 11*”) (“VolynPost”, December 11, 2022); “На росії виградали фейк, щоб орки не боялися нового озброєння ЗСУ” (“*In Russia, they invented a fake so that the Orcs would not be afraid of the new weapons of the Armed Forces*”) (“Konkurent”, May 08, 2022); “Український спецназ одним пострілом знищив 82 орки і їх техніку (відео)” (“*Ukrainian special forces destroyed 82 orcs and their equipment with one shot* (video)”) (“Konkurent”, May 22, 2022); “Українки орку з автоматом можуть в обличчя сказати усе, що про нього думають, – враження з окупації” (“*Ukrainian women can say to the face of an orc with a machine gun everything they think about him – impressions from the occupation*”) (“Radio Track”, November 09, 2022). Also, the Secretary of the NSDC, Oleksiy Danilov, urged Ukrainians not to call Russians *orcs* and *pig dogs*, so as not to hide the responsibility of the Russians for the bloody war in Ukraine under these euphemistic terms, as we read in the article “Данілов радить не називати росіян орками та свинособаками” (“*Danilov advises not to call Russians orcs and pig dogs*”) (“Konkurent”, December 25, 2022).

We sporadically find journalistic materials that testify to negative statements regarding the world community's attitude toward Ukraine. On the “Radio Track” website, a news article was published with the title “Hungary has blocked an aid package from the EU worth 18 billion euros to Ukraine, - mass media”. Already in the lead, journalists resort to connotative lexemes and evaluative judgments, calling Hungary a “dung country” because of its hostile attitude, and claiming: “Hungary once again proved that it is, in fact, our enemy and serves the interests of the Russian Federation”. The material also provides unconfirmed information, which is only an assumption that maybe Hungary wants to extort funds for itself. Journalists, when describing it, use the evaluative lexeme “*вициганити*” (“*extort*”). The news also publishes comments from social networks, where people ask each other how swearing sounds in Hungarian, “in order to adequately convey to the Madyars what we think of them” – media explains this course. Violating professional ethics, the media not only provides links to discussions, but also encourages the use of abusive words against Hungarians. The use of the ethnonym “Madyar”, as well as evaluative statements, indicates the language of enmity, because the material clearly contains prejudice and indicates a certain inferiority of this ethnic group. This information resource resorted to other connotative constructions in news materials to designate enemies: journalists called Putin “*кремлівський дід*” “*Kremlin geezer*”, the chief spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Defense Konashenkov – the “*chief liar of the Kremlin*”, and his successor – “the great Madame Surovkina” and “*Russian dirty bomb*”.

#### 4 Conclusion

The scientific generalization, theoretical justification, characteristics and specifics of the study of hate speech as a negative phenomenon in the mass media made it possible to draw the following conclusions. Negative statements in journalistic texts are dangerous, because the information read in the media can become an incentive for actions (aggression and conflicts, and in the worst case – violence). The most uncontrolled spread of hate rhetoric occurs in social networks, where users often leave offensive comments with impunity and anonymously and use negatively colored words that can provoke sharp conflicts between different social groups. Hate speech evaluates the personal qualities of specific individuals based on their belonging to a particular social community. Journalists repeatedly submit clearly hyperbolic headlines, when they also “hang” so-called evaluation labels on a person because of his belonging to a certain social group. In the conditions of war, most often these are internally displaced persons, Russian-

speaking Ukrainians, less often – countries that are reluctant to support Ukraine in the war at the international level. In order to avoid such non-normative formations and aggressive rhetoric, in order not to play along with hostile narratives aimed at dividing Ukrainian society, it is necessary to be guided by journalistic standards, to know the appropriate terminology, as well as to follow the rules of journalistic ethics regarding the portrayal of certain categories of people in the mass media. Hate speech is an invisible tool of “hybrid war” that forms certain negative psychological attitudes against the culture and ideals of the participants on the opposite side of the conflict. Veiled forms of “hate speech” in the media space allow any individual or group of individuals to use such phenomena as social stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination against opponents with the help of normative vocabulary. Despite the aggression caused by the war, Ukrainian media workers should be tolerant of their citizens, not resort to hate speech in publications about IDPs or Russian-speaking Ukrainians, so as not to split society and promote Russian narratives. After all, negative content will lead to prejudices, conflicts, skirmishes between Ukrainians from the West and the East, while in conditions of war, we must be united, act in harmony for a common victory.

Comparative studies of the fixation of hate speech in all-Ukrainian mass media compared to local mass media, analysis of common and distinctive features, as well as outlining ways to prevent incorrect words from entering the language of the mass media that violate journalistic ethical norms and generate hate speech in wartime can be promising in this direction of research.

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#### Primary Paper Section: A

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